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Responses to Gender Inequality in the Division
of Family Work: The Status Quo Effect
Esther S. Kluwer1
This study addresses responses to gender inequality in the division of family
work as well as the outcomes of those responses. Ninety-eight husbands and
95 wives responded to stimulus information manipulated by means of
scenarios. Participants reported more wife-demand/husband-withdraw
interaction than husband-demand/wife-withdraw interaction when the wife was
discontent with her spouse's contribution to family work, but the
demand/withdraw interaction patterns were reported equally when the husband
was discontent. The data showed support for the Status Quo Effect
Hypothesis: The likelihood that the spouse's contribution to family work
remained unchanged (i.e., status quo maintenance) was rated higher than the
likelihood that the spouse would increase his/her contribution to family work.
In line with this, when the wife was discontent, wife-demand/husband-withdraw
interaction was negatively related to the likelihood that the spouse would do
more family work. Finally, participants reported a greater likelihood for
discontent spouses than for content spouses to increase their own contribution,
but discontent husbands were more likely to do so than discontent wives.
The allocation of family work (i.e., housework and child care) is a "hot
issue" in many relationships, especially among couples with young children,
and it causes a substantial amount of dissatisfaction and marital conflict
(Cowan et al., 1985; Holmes and Murray, 1996; Kluwer et al., 1996, 1997a,
1997b). How do people respond to gender inequalities and subsequent dis-
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satisfaction in their relationship? What happens when one spouse tries to
change the division of labor because he or she is discontent with the status
quo? Because more and more women participate in the labor force and
relationships are gradually becoming more egalitarian, conflict about gen-
der roles is inevitable and couples have to negotiate who does what in the
household (Buunk et al., 1997; see also Caycedo et al., 1991; Goodnow and
Bowes, 1994). Women will increasingly recognize their family arrangements
as unfair and they may respond to the injustice, for example, by pushing
for change (Thompson, 1991). Accordingly, we have to expand our knowl-
edge about how couples negotiate the division of labor and understand
how partners hinder or create change through their mutual interactions.
Although ample research has addressed the causes of inequality in
the household, much less is known about the responses to inequality and
injustice in the division of family work. According to justice theories, people
are less satisfied with the division of labor the more it is perceived as unjust
(cf. Mikula et al). Perceived injustice and subsequent dissatisfaction may
stem from inequity (Walster et al., 1978), inequality (Deutsch, 1975), or
when individuals' needs are not met (Mills and Clark, 1982). Because
housework generally tends to be disliked (Robinson and Spitze, 1992) and
given the beneficial effects of parents' involvement in child care (e.g.,
Baruch and Barnett, 1986; Deutsch et al., 1993), spouses will generally strive
for more rather than less participation from their spouse (cf. Kluwer et al.,
1996). Accordingly, spouses are more dissatisfied the less their spouse con-
tributes to family work (Mikula et al., 1997a).2
The predominating view of the division of labor is that of a fixed agree-
ment between spouses. Prior research has failed to recognize that spouses
actively negotiate and renegotiate the division of labor on a continuous basis.
Therefore, recent research has provided an interaction-based approach by
illuminating the issues, marital interaction patterns, and outcomes of conflict
over the division of labor (Kluwer et al., 1997a, 1997b, 1998). Within this
framework, Kluwer and colleagues (1997b) reported research on how cou-
ples respond to discontent about the labor distribution through de-
mand/withdraw interactions. They conducted two field experiments in which
first-time parents responded to stimulus information manipulated by means
of scenarios. Husbands and wives rated the extent to which demand/with-
draw interaction patterns occurred when the conflict issue involved the wife
2here is some evidence that women are more satisfied with the division of family work and
perceive it as more fair than would be expected given the inequality of the division of labor
(e.g., Major, 1993; Mederer, 1993; Sanchez, 1994; Thompson, 1991). However, research has
shown that conflict over the division of labor does exist (for reviews, see Caycedo et al., 1991;
Goodnow and Bowes, 1994; Kluwer et al., 1996), especially among couples with egalitarian
attitudes (Kluwer et al., 1997a) and among couples with young children (Kluwer et al., 1998).
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versus the husband seeking change in the division of labor, and the extent
to which spouses would reach their goal (i.e., status quo maintenance vs.
change) in this conflict situation. The results showed that wife-demand/hus-
band-withdraw interaction was the typical reaction to the typical conflict situ-
ation in which the wife is discontent with her husband's contribution to
housework, while her husband wants to maintain the status quo. It further
showed that defendants of the status quo were more likely to reach their
goal than complainants, but discontent wives were more likely to accomplish
change than discontent husbands when the conflict issue concerned their
own gender stereotypical domain (i.e., family work).
As shown later, the studies by Kluwer et al. (1997b) left important
questions unanswered. The present study therefore replicates and extends
the findings of Kluwer et al. by addressing two research questions. First,
how do couples respond to the (typical) conflict situation in which one
spouse is dissatisfied with the division of family work and wants the other
spouse to increase his or her contribution, whereas the other spouse is sat-
isfied with the task allocation in the relationship? Hence, the starting point
is spouses' discontent due to the fact that the other spouse contributes too
little to family work. Second, what are the outcomes of conflict over the
division of family work, that is, who "wins" the argument? This study tests
two competing predictions with regard to whether conflicting spouses ac-
complish their goals (i.e., status quo maintenance vs. change).
Responses to Gender Inequality
The situation in which one spouse is discontent with the division of
labor and wants the other to increase his or her contribution involves an
asymmetrical structure: The discontent spouse wants to change the status
quo and needs the other's active cooperation to reach that objective,
whereas the other spouse wants to maintain the status quo and can reach
this goal by doing what he or she normally does. In a conflict with this
particular structure, the discontent spouse is likely to pressure the other
for change, while the other will avoid a discussion that may lead to a
change in his or her own behavior. In close relationships, this type of in-
teraction has been labeled a demand/withdraw interaction: One spouse at-
tempts to engage in a discussion, resorting to pressures and demands,
while the other attempts to avoid conflict and withdraws from the discus-
sion. Research has shown that in marital conflict women tend to demand,
which involves pressuring, requesting or demanding change, nagging,
blaming, accusing, and criticizing, and men tend to withdraw, which in-
volves physical withdrawal, becoming silent, defending, and avoiding a dis-
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cussion (e.g., Christensen and Heavey, 1990; Christensen and Schenk,
1991; Cowan et al., 1985; Gottman and Krokoff, 1989; Heavey et al., 1993;
Kelley et al., 1978; Rusbult, 1993).
Why is it that women generally have a tendency to demand and that
men have a tendency to withdraw in marital conflict? A social structural
explanation is that men are the primary beneficiaries of the traditional
marriage, are more likely to have structured the relationship to their liking
and subsequently have little or less interest in changing the status quo
(Heavey et al., 1993). Women tend to be less satisfied with the status quo
of the relationship and engagement in conflict is their means of changing
the relationship according to their desires (cf. Scanzoni, 1978; Scanzoni
and Fox, 1980). Inequality and disadvantage lead to emotional distress,
including anger (Mirowksy and Ross, 1995; Reichle and Montada, 1994).
Women have higher levels of anger due to inequalities in the relationship
and are more likely to express their anger than men (Ross and Van Wil-
ligen, 1996). As women more frequently find themselves in the deprived
position in close relationships, they have a higher probability to show de-
manding behavior, whereas men have a higher probability to show with-
drawing behavior because they more frequently find themselves in the
advantaged position.
An individual differences explanation claims that men have developed
a self differentiated from others, whereas women have developed a self in re-
lation to others (Chodorow, 1978; Gilligan, 1982; Miller, 1986). Subsequent
socialization reinforces men's achievement orientation and need for auton-
omy, and women's relationship orientation and need for connectedness and
commonality of experience (Christensen and Heavey, 1990; Cross and Mad-
son, 1997; Eagly, 1987; Heavey et al., 1993; Maccoby and Jacklin, 1987).
This gender difference permeates social interactions and, in close relation-
ships, it predicts women to be pursuing in their search for connectedness,
whereas it predicts men to withdraw in pursuit of their autonomy.
The structure of the conflict predicts husbands and wives to demand
when they desire a change in their spouses' contribution to the division of
labor and to withdraw when they want to maintain the division of labor
the way it is (cf. Klinetob and Smith, 1996). The gender difference in con-
flict behavior in close relationships predicts wives to demand and husbands
to withdraw during conflict over the division of labor, regardless of the
conflict structure. Following from this, wife-demand/husband-withdraw in-
teraction will occurs particularly when the wife wants to change the status
quo and her husband does not (cf. Christensen and Heavey, 1990; Heavey
et al., 1993; Kluwer et al., 1997b). The wife's desire for change enhances
her tendency to demand, whereas the husband's desire to maintain the
status quo enhances his tendency to withdraw. When the husband is dis-
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content, wife-demand/husband-withdraw and husband-demand/wife-with-
draw interaction may both occur to a moderate degree. The husband's de-
sire for change motivates him to demand, but withdrawal is induced by his
tendency to withdraw. The wife's desire to maintain the status quo moti-
vates her to withdraw, but demanding behavior is induced by her tendency
to demand. In sum, wife-demand/husband-withdraw interaction occurs
more frequently than husband-demand/wife-withdraw interaction during
conflict over the division of labor, but especially when the wife rather than
the husband desires a change in her spouse's contribution to the division
of labor (Hypothesis 1).
Status Quo Maintenance Versus Change
To what extent do spouses reach their goal when they dispute the
division of labor? Kluwer et al. (1997b) showed that those in favor of the
status quo were more likely to reach their goal than those who desired a
change in the division of labor. Those who want change depend on the
cooperation of the other spouse, that is, whether the other is willing to
change his or her behavior. Those in favor of the status quo can reach
their goal without the cooperation of the other party, simply by changing
nothing. Consequently, they have a major advantage over those who want
change: The status quo is on their side and this gives them more power
over the outcome (cf. Keltner and Robinson, 1997; Pruitt, 1995).3 In gen-
eral, changing the status quo involves the need to formulate new arrange-
ments, transition costs, ambivalence, risk, and uncertainty. Hence, people
tend to disproportionally stick with the status quo (Ritov and Baron, 1992;
Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). In addition, people are committed to
their past decisions and often think that past alternatives have been chosen
wisely (Schweitzer, 1994), and regulations that have been used in the past
are frequently perceived as just (Homans, 1974; Mikula et al., 1997b). (It
should be noted that there is mixed evidence. For example, Reichle, 1996,
reported that the tradition principle was among the two most rejected prin-
ciples in the division of labor among spouses.)
3One could argue that defendants need the cooperation of complainants to maintain the status
quo. For example, the husband who wants to maintain the current division of labor depends
on his wife to keep doing her share. The wife has control over his outcome (i.e., the status
quo) because she can stop doing housework altogether. However, this outcome is most likely
worse for the wife than maintaining the status quo because in that situation the housework
does not get done at all (see Kelley, 1979, p. 25). This suggests that complainants indeed
have less control over the outcome than defendants because the complainant's influence
strategy leads to a situation in which they are worse off than before.
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Preference for the status quo can also be explained in terms of loss
aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Ritov and Baron, 1992). Changing
the status quo entails gains and losses across different dimensions. Since
people are loss averse and losses weigh more heavily than commensurate
gains, people will favor the current state of affairs. Consequently, loss aver-
sion favors stability over change (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). In addi-
tion, conflict parties' perspective on the conflict outcome (i.e., whether they
face a potential loss or a potential gain) affects their concession behavior.
Conflict parties who face a potential gain concede more and settle more
easily than conflict parties who face a potential loss (see De Dreu et al.,
1995). A change from the status quo yields a potential loss for those in
favor of the status quo, whereas it implies a potential gain for those who
desire change. Accordingly, those who desire change may yield more easily
than those who favor the status quo and, consequently, fail to reach their
goal.
Kluwer et al. (1997b) also found that discontented women were more
likely to accomplish change than discontented men when the complaint
concerned their own gender stereotypical domain (i.e., family work). In fact,
when wives wanted a change in their spouses' contribution, husbands and
wives were equally successful in accomplishing their respective goals of
status quo maintenance and change. An explanation for the finding that
women were more successful than men in accomplishing change is that
women's demanding behavior enhances their goal accomplishment. Coer-
cion can be effective in unilateral goal accomplishment (De Dreu, 1995;
Noller et al., 1994; Patterson, 1982; Rubin et al., 1994). Men's tendency to
withdraw decreases their chance of goal accomplishment when they want
to change the status quo. Withdrawal on the part of the discontent spouse
results in status quo maintenance because no attempt is made to change
the situation. Kluwer et al. (1997b) also suggested that women had more
control over the outcomes because they possess greater knowledge, skill,
and information with regard to the division of labor (cf. Babcock et al.,
1993; Cromwell and Olson, 1975; French and Raven; 1959). Accordingly,
they can use their informational influence and expert power to accomplish
change (cf. Brown et al., 1990; Dovidio et al., 1988).
The findings of Kluwer et al. (1997b) suggest that wife-demand/hus-
band-withdraw interaction increases the wife's chance of accomplishing
change because her coercion and expert power makes her husband comply
eventually. Husbands were found to withdraw when their wives wanted a
change in their contribution and yet wives managed to accomplish a change
in their husbands' contribution. This suggests that despite their initial re-
sistance through withdrawal, husbands capitulated to their wives' persistent
pressures and demands. In sum, this line of reasoning leads to the predic-
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tion that discontent wives are more likely to accomplish change than dis-
content husbands (Coercion Hypothesis).
Kluwer et al.'s (1997b) results are puzzling for two reasons. First, the
finding that wives were successful in accomplishing change in their hus-
bands' contribution to family work contradicts reality. Wives tend to do
more family work than their husbands despite their dissatisfaction with the
gendered division of labor and these gendered patterns tend to persist (e.g.,
Biernat and Wortman, 1991; Spitze, 1988; Thompson and Walker, 1989).
Second, the findings contradict the notion that withdrawal and conflict
avoidance support the status quo. A way to maintain the current state of
affairs is to change nothing and withdraw from a discussion that may lead
to change. For these reasons, one would expect wife-demand/husband-with-
draw interaction to enhance the husband's chance of maintaining the status
quo because his withdrawal is in favor of the status quo. This leads to the
following prediction: Those in favor of the status quo are more likely to
reach their goal than those who want to change the division of labor (Status
Quo Effect Hypothesis).
Kluwer et al. (1997b) made inferences about the relationship be-
tween conflict behavior and conflict outcomes but did not actually test
these relationships. Following the Coercion Hypothesis, one would predict
that wife-demand/husband-withdraw interaction is positively related to a
change in the spouse's contribution (i.e., negatively related to status quo
maintenance) when the wife wants to change the status quo. The same
can be predicted for husband-demand/wife-withdraw interaction when the
husband wants to change the status quo. Following the Status Quo Effect
Hypothesis, one would expect that wife-demand/husband-withdraw inter-
action is negatively related to a change in the spouse's contribution (i.e.,
positively related to status quo maintenance) when the wife wants to
change the status quo. Again, the same can be predicted for husband-de-
mand/wife-withdraw interaction when the husband wants to change the
status quo.
Two other issues are addressed in the current study. First, Kluwer et
al. (1997b) did not manipulate the direction of the desired change—it was
unknown whether the discontent spouse wanted the other spouse to do
more or less family work—which may have confounded the results. Partici-
pants may have reported a greater likelihood of change because it was un-
specified. For example, actually making the spouse do more family work
may be much harder to accomplish than an unspecified change in the
spouse's contribution because the latter may be in either direction. In this
study, the direction of the desired change is that the discontent spouse
wants the other spouse to do more family work. Second, in addition to
changes in the contribution of those who defend the status quo, this study
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assesses changes in the contribution of those who desire change. Discontent
spouses who want the other to do more family work may resolve this prob-
lem by doing it themselves. This study explores to what extent husbands
and wives are likely to increase their own contribution to family work as a
result of their dissatisfaction.
METHOD
Design and Scenario
To test the hypotheses, the present research adopted a scenario meth-
odology similar to the studies reported by Kluwer et al. (1997b). The sce-
nario described a conflict situation in which one spouse is discontented
with the time the other spouse spends on housework or child care and
wants the other spouse to spend more time on housework or child care,
while the other spouse is satisfied with the status quo. The design was a
2x2 factorial, involving Discontent spouse (husband vs. wife) and Conflict
issue (housework vs. child care), both manipulated between subjects. Con-
flict issue did not have any main or interaction effects in any of the analy-
ses, so this variable is not discussed any further. Participants read a scenario
in which they either had the role of the discontent spouse or the role of
the content spouse. In the Conflict issue is housework condition, the sce-
narios read as follow:
you are dissatisfied about the time your spouse spends on household tasks. On the
whole, you think that your spouse pays too little attention to housework, and spends
too little time tidying, cleaning, doing the dishes, or doing groceries. In other words,
you want your spouse to spend more time on housework. However, your spouse is
satisfied with the situation as it is.
Your spouse is dissatisfied about the time you spend on household tasks. On the whole,
your spouse thinks that you pay too little attention to housework, and spend too
little time tidying, cleaning, doing the dishes, or doing groceries. In other words,
your spouse wants you to spend more time on housework. However, you are satisfied
with the situation as it is.
In the Conflict issue is child care condition a similar scenario was
presented with examples adjusted to the conflict issue. The between-sub-
jects factor Discontent spouse was construed by crossing gender of par-
ticipant with the role in the scenario (discontent or content spouse). In
other words, the Discontent spouse is husband condition contained male
participants in the role of discontent spouse ("You are dissatisfied...") and
female participants in the role of content spouse ("Your spouse is dissat-
isfied..."). The Discontent spouse is wife condition contained female par-
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ticipants in the role of discontent spouse and male participants in the role
of content spouse.
Participants and Procedure
Participants in the study were 98 husbands and 95 wives from the
same couples. Spouses had shared a household for 6.7 years on average.
To standardize the family situation of the couples and to control for the
effects of the number and age of children, the criterion for selection was
that the first and only child was under 18 months old (x = 14.4, SD =
1.2). The mean ages of men and women were 32.7 and 30.5 years, respec-
tively. Participants were in a research program on the division of labor dur-
ing the transition to parenthood. Husbands and wives received their
questionnaire in a separate envelope that was addressed to them personally.
They were instructed not to discuss the questionnaire with their spouse
until they each had completed it, and they returned their questionnaires
in separate envelopes. Nonrespondents were reminded by phone. Eventu-
ally, 78% of the participants returned their completed questionnaire by
mail. Participants were assigned to experimental conditions on a random
basis. Due to small variations in the response rates between conditions and
due to missing data, the number of participants in the conditions varied
between 45 and 51, approximately half of which were male and half were
female. As husbands and wives came from the same couples, their re-
sponses may be correlated (cf. Kenny, 1995). However, participants were
assigned to experimental conditions on a random basis. Therefore, hus-
bands' and wives' data were treated as independent observations in the
analyses (cf. Kluwer et al., 1997b).
Dependent Variables
Participants read the scenario and were instructed to try to imagine
they were in the described situation, and to write down how they and their
spouse would deal with the described situation. Three coders independently
rated all answers to this open-ended question. Coders were uninformed as
to the design or hypotheses under study and the gender of the participant,
although the latter sometimes became apparent from the answer when par-
ticipants explicitly mentioned their "husband" or "wife." instead of their
"spouse" or "partner." Coders completed one day of training and inde-
pendently rated all answers.
After reading the entire answer, coders rated the degree to which the
answer represented the following behaviors (1 = not representative to 4 =
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very representative): The participant pressures the spouse, blames the
spouse, withdraws, and avoids. These categories were derived from the
Conflict Rating System (i.e., the demand and withdraw subscale; Heavey
et al., 1993), which was developed to characterize the behavior of couples
during problem-solving discussions (cf. Christensen and Heavey, 1990; Klu-
wer et al., 1997b). The same items were used to rate the behavior of the
spouse. Afterwards, data were receded as to the gender of the participant
(i.e., when the participant was male, "participant avoids" became "husband
avoids" and when the participant was female, "participant avoids" became
"wife avoids").
As a measure of interobserver agreement, Cronbach's alphas were
computed between coders for each item. Alphas for the behavior items
ranged from .61 to .87 with a mean of .77. As a measure of the consistency
of the subscales, Cronbach's alphas were computed across the individual
ratings for the items of the subscales. Following the Conflict Rating System,
the demand subscale consisted of the items "pressuring the spouse" and
"blaming the spouse" (a = .64 for husband-demand and .69 for wife-de-
mand). The withdraw-subscale consisted of the items "withdrawing" and
"avoiding" (a = .64 for husband-withdraw and .68 for wife-withdraw).
Means were then computed across the individual ratings for the items of
the demand and withdraw subscales. To create the demand/withdraw inter-
action scales, wife-demand and husband-withdraw were summed and hus-
band-demand and wife-withdraw were summed (cf. Christensen and
Heavey, 1990; Klinetob and Smith, 1996; Kluwer et al., 1997b).
Finally, participants rated the likelihood of three conflict outcomes
in the described situation (1 = very unlikely to 7 = very likely). In the Con-
flict issue is housework condition, participants in the role of discontent
spouse rated the following outcomes: "My spouse's time spent on house-
work remains unchanged" (content spouse reaches goal), "My spouse
spends more time on housework" (content spouse does more), and "I spend
more time on housework" (discontent spouse does more). Participants in
the role of content spouse rated the following outcomes: "My time spent
on housework remains unchanged" (content spouse reaches goal), "I spend
more time on housework" (content spouse does more), and "My spouse
spends more time on housework" (discontent spouse does more). In the
Conflict issue is child care condition, the same items were rated for child
care instead of housework. The conflict outcome content spouse reaches goal
represented status quo maintenance and the conflict outcome content
spouse does more represented the desired change. The conflict outcome
discontent spouse does more referred to the discontent spouse's own con-
tribution to family work.
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RESULTS
Demand/Withdraw Interaction
Hypothesis 1 was tested with a 2 x 2 (Discontent spouse x De-
mand/withdraw interaction) analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the last
factor as repeated measures (see Fig. 1). The dependent variable was the
rated degree to which the answer represented wife-demand/husband-with-
draw interaction and husband-demand/wife-withdraw interaction. The main
effect of Discontent spouse was not significant, F(l, 184) = 0.77, ns. The
significant main effect of Demand/withdraw interaction, F(l, 184) = 5.00,
p < 0.05, was qualified by a significant interaction effect of Discontent
spouse by Demand/withdraw interaction, F(l, 184) = 11.97, p < 0.001.
When the wife was discontent, participants reported more wife-de-
mand/husband-withdraw interaction (x = 2.39) than husband-demand/wife-
withdraw interaction (x = 2.18), t(96) = 3.56, p < 0.001. When the husband
was discontent, husband-demand/wife-withdraw (* = 2.26) and wife-de-
mand/husband-withdraw (jc = 2.22) interaction were reported equally, f(88)
= 1.06, ns. Also, wife-demand/husband-withdraw interaction was reported
more often when the wife rather than the husband was discontent, ((185)
= 2.46, p < 0.05, and husband-demand/wife-withdraw interaction was re-
ported equally when the husband or the wife was discontent, f(184) = 1.54,
ns. In sum, Hypothesis 1 was supported. Wife-demand/husband-withdraw
interaction was more likely to occur than husband-demand/wife-withdraw
interaction during conflict over the division of labor, but only when the
wife wanted an increase in her husband's contribution.
Conflict Outcomes
To test the Coercion Hypothesis and the Status Quo Effect Hypothe-
sis, a 2 x 2 (Discontent spouse x Conflict outcome) ANOVA was con-
ducted, with the last factor as repeated measures. The dependent variable
was the reported likelihood of status quo maintenance (content spouse
reaches goal) and change (content spouse does more). This analysis re-
vealed a significant main effect of Conflict outcome, F(l, 189) = 141.71,
p < 0.001. Participants reported a greater likelihood that the content
spouse would reach his/her goal (3c = 3.57) than that the content spouse
would do more family work (x = 1.85). The main effect of Discontent
spouse was not significant, F(l, 189) = 1.89, ns, and neither was the in-
teraction effect of Discontent spouse by Conflict outcome, F(l, 189) = 0.17,
ns. These results lend support for the Status Quo Effect Hypothesis that
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Fig. 1. Rated representativeness of demand/withdraw interac-
tion as a function of Discontent spouse (H = husband, W =
wife).
those in favor of the status quo are more likely to reach their goal than
those who desired change. As participants did not report that discontent
wives would be more likely accomplish change than discontent husbands,
the data showed no support for the Coercion Hypothesis.
To explore the discontent spouse's own contribution, a 2 x 2 (Dis-
content spouse x Conflict outcome) ANOVA was conducted, with the last
factor as repeated measures. The dependent variable was the reported like-
lihood of an increase in the content spouse's contribution (content spouse
does more) and the discontent spouse's contribution (discontent spouse
does more). The significant main effects of Conflict outcome, F(l, 188) =
81.55, p < 0.001, and Discontent spouse, F(i, 188) = 9.35, p < 0.01, were
qualified by a significant interaction effect of Discontent spouse by Conflict
outcome, F(l, 188) = 7.67, p < 0.01 (Fig. 2). Participants reported a greater
likelihood that the discontent spouse would increase his/her contribution
than that the content spouse would increase his/her contribution, both when
the husband was discontent (x = 3.44 vs. x = 1.96, respectively), t(89) =
7.35, p < 0.001, and when the wife was discontent (x = 2.55 vs. x = 1.76,
respectively), f(99) = 5.09, p < 0.001. However, the reported likelihood
that discontent husbands would increase their own contribution (jp = 3.44)
was rated higher than the likelihood that discontent wives would increase
their own contribution (x = 2.55), f(188) = 3.68, p < 0.001. The reported
likelihood that content husbands and content wives would increase their
own contribution did not differ, f(189) = 0.97, ns.
To summarize, the data showed support for the Status Quo Effect
Hypothesis: The likelihood that the content spouse's contribution to family
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Fig. 2. Self-reported likelihood of conflict outcomes
as a function of Discontent spouse.
work remained unchanged was rated higher than the likelihood that the
content spouse would do more family work. The Coercion Hypothesis that
discontent wives were more likely to accomplish change than discontent
husbands was not supported. However, the likelihood that discontent wives
would increase their own contribution was rated lower than the likelihood
that discontent husbands would increase their own contribution.
Relationships Between Demand/Withdraw Interaction and Conflict
Outcomes
Zero-order correlations between the rated demand/withdraw interac-
tion patterns and self-reported conflict outcomes showed a significant nega-
tive relationship between wife-demand/husband-withdraw interaction and
the likelihood that the content spouse would do more family work when
the wife was discontent (Table I). This implies that when the wife desired
change, wife-demand/husband-withdraw interaction decreased the chance
that her husband would do more family work. Again, this is in support of
the Status Quo Effect Hypothesis. By contrast, when the husband was dis-
content, husband-demand/wife-withdraw interaction was negatively related
to the likelihood that the content spouse would reach his/her goal. This
implies that when the husband desired change, husband-demand/wife-with-
draw interaction decreased the chance of status quo maintenance. This is
in support of the Coercion Hypothesis. It should be noted here that the
correlations are low and may reflect chance, as only 2 of 12 correlations
were significant. Interpretations of these correlations should be made with
caution.
349
350 Kluwer
Table I. Zero-Order Correlations Between Marital Interaction Patterns and Conflict
Outcomes in both Discontent Spouse Conditions
Discontent husband condition
H-demand/W-withdraw
W-demand/H-withdraw
Discontent wife condition
H-demand/W-withdraw
W-demand/H-withdraw
Status quo
maintenance
-.34*
-.10
.04
-.03
Content spouse
does more
.01
.11
-.04
-.25a
Discontent spouse
does more
-.04
-.08
-.15
-.15
ap < 0.01.
bp < 0.001.
DISCUSSION
This research investigated husbands' and wives' responses to discon-
tent due to gender inequality in the division of family work, as well as the
outcomes of those responses. It tested the prediction that wife-demand/hus-
band-withdraw interaction would occur more frequently than husband-de-
mand/wife-withdraw interaction during conflict over family work, but
especially when the wife desired an increase in her spouse's contribution.
Furthermore, this study tested two competing predictions with regard to
the outcomes of conflict over the division of family work. The Coercion
Hypothesis predicted that discontent wives would be more likely to accom-
plish change than discontent husbands because wives' demanding behavior
and expert power would make their husbands yield. The Status Quo Effect
Hypothesis predicted that those in favor of the status quo are more likely
to reach their goal than those who seek change because their withdrawal
is in favor of the status quo.
As predicted, participants reported more wife-demand/husband-with-
draw interaction than husband-demand/wife-withdraw interaction when the
wife was discontent, but husband-demand/wife-withdraw and wife-de-
mand/husband-withdraw interaction were reported equally when the hus-
band was discontent. Accordingly, wife-demand/husband-withdraw
interaction was more likely to occur than husband-demand/wife-withdraw
interaction in response to the scenario, but only when the wife wanted her
spouse to do more family work. This replicates the findings from Kluwer
et al. (1997b). In addition, the data show support for the Status Quo Effect
Hypothesis: Participants reported a greater likelihood that the content
spouse would reach his/her goal (i.e., status quo maintenance) than that
the content spouse would increase his/her contribution to family work. This
implies that those in favor of the status quo are more likely to reach their
goal than those who desired change. In line with this, when the wife was
discontent, wife-demand/husband-withdraw interaction was negatively re-
lated to the reported likelihood that the husband would do more family
work. The data do not replicate Kluwer et al's (1997b) finding that dis-
content women were more likely than discontent men to accomplish change
in the domain of family work. Since both studies showed support for the
status quo effect, the conclusion seems warranted that those who favor the
status quo maintain the status quo by withdrawing from discussions that
might lead to change and new arrangements. Their advantage is likely to
stem from the fact that they have more power over the outcome because
the status quo is on their side (cf. Keltner and Robinson, 1997).
Following prior research (Christensen and Heavey, 1990; Heavey et
al., 1993; Kluwer et al., 1997b), this research provides evidence that the
structure of the conflict issue combined with the gender linkage in behavior
causes couples' response to gender inequality to become highly stereotyped.
Many areas of gender inequality involve domains where men benefit from
the status quo and women desire change. Accordingly, wife-demand/hus-
band-withdraw interaction is likely to be the response to gender inequality
in close relationships. Wife-demand/husband-withdraw interaction is gen-
erally associated with destructive consequences, such as polarization, con-
flict escalation, and marital distress (Christensen and Heavey, 1990;
Gottman, 1979; Heavey et al., 1993; Kluwer et al., 1997a). The current study
shows that it is also negatively associated with actual change. Consequently,
this research identifies an important barrier to the negotiation of new ar-
rangements and gender roles.
Surprisingly, husband-demand/wife-withdraw interaction was nega-
tively related to the likelihood of status quo maintenance when the husband
was discontent. In other words, the wife's withdrawal did not seem to help
her maintain the status quo. Perhaps husband-demand/wife-withdraw inter-
action results in other outcomes, such as an integrative agreement or hiring
others to do family work (e.g., a housekeeper or nanny). Research revealed
that husband-demand/wife-withdraw interaction had a positive effect on
later marital satisfaction (Christensen and Heavey, 1990; Heavey et al.,
1993). Heavey et al. argued that couples who display nonstereotyped roles
are able to avoid the increasing polarization and rigidity that is associated
with stereotyped gender behavior (i.e., wife-demand/husband-withdraw in-
teraction). In addition, wives generally react positively to their husbands'
willingness to discuss relationship issues (Acitelli, 1992), and may perceive
their husband's demanding behavior as commitment to the relationship. In
addition, husbands tend to complain much less than wives (Kluwer et al.,
1997a). Consequently, wives may be more receptive to their husband's com-
plaints and couples may respond in more positive ways when the husband
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rather than the wife is discontent. Future research should address to what
extent spouses respond in constructive ways and manage to reach integra-
tive solutions during conflict about the division of labor.
The data further show that participants report a greater likelihood
for discontent spouses than for content spouses to increase their own con-
tribution, but discontent husbands are more likely to do so than discontent
wives. This implies that discontent spouses are more likely to do the extra
work themselves when they feel their spouse does not contribute enough,
but husbands are more inclined to do so than wives. Husbands may feel
it is not legitimate to complain about their wives' contribution as most wives
already do most of the family work. Men tend to perceive themselves as
advantaged in close relationships (Buunk and VanYperen, 1989). Because
people tend to dislike advantageous inequity (Messick and Sentis, 1985;
Hatfield et al., 1984; Walster et al., 1978), men may be more inclined to
increase their own contribution to family work, despite their discontent,
because they perceive the overall division of labor is inequitable in their
advantage. This has been extensively analyzed and described as the exis-
tential guilt effect of the privileged (Montada et al., 1986; Montada and
Schneider, 1989).
How do these findings relate to the issue of justice? Justice literature
shows that people are interested in issues of process rather than issues of
outcome and that fair procedures are important (see Lind and Tyler, 1988,
for an overview). Individuals who are given voice judge not only the pro-
cedure as more fair but also the outcome as more fair than individuals
who are not given voice (Lind et al., 1990) and voice in decision-making
results in greater satisfaction with the outcome (Folger et al., 1979). In close
relationships, the ability to voice views and opinions causes conflicting
spouses to be more satisfied with the conflict outcome and perceive the
outcome as more fair. Withdrawal on the part of one of the spouses clearly
prohibits voice and has a negative impact on satisfaction and fairness judg-
ments. A longitudinal study by Kluwer et al. (1998) showed that, rather
than affecting the actual contributions of each spouse, the way spouses ne-
gotiated the division of labor affected wives' satisfaction and fairness judg-
ments. Their research showed support for the voice effect (cf. Folger, 1977):
Independent of the actual division of labor, wives' satisfaction and per-
ceived fairness were related to whether the division of labor was discussed
in constructive ways. In sum, the way spouses manage conflict over the
division of labor affects their satisfaction and fairness judgments with re-
gard to the division of labor.
A few limitations to this research deserve attention. First, the self-re-
port nature of this study and the hypothetical character of the scenarios
merely allows for conclusions about couples' beliefs about marital interac-
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tion patterns in a hypothetical situation. Although prior research suggests
that the hypothetical situations used in this study occur in couples' lives
(Kluwer et al., 1997b), the scenarios were still hypothetical and undeter-
mined in terms of how removed they were from real life.
Second, the scenarios did not contain information about the absolute
or relative amount of work done by spouses. This may have caused the
meaning of the scenarios to be ambiguous, especially in the case of dis-
content husbands. Participants may have assumed that the discontent hus-
band in the scenario was doing more family work than his wife or, perhaps
more likely, that he was doing less family work than his wife but never-
theless experienced discontent over her contribution. In the latter case, it
may not be surprising that discontent husbands were rated more likely to
increase their own contribution than discontent wives. Hence, the meaning
participants attached to the scenario has implications for the interpretation
of the results and the interpretations of the results on conflict outcomes
should be made with caution. I emphasize, however, that this study focused
explicitly on spouses' reactions to discontent over the division of labor. The
objective imbalance in the division of labor may thus have less impact on
participants' ratings. Nevertheless, further research is needed in which the
objective imbalance in the division of labor is taken into account. For ex-
ample, it would be interesting to study whether objective imbalances are
recognized by spouses and whether they perceive them as unjust (cf. Mikula
et al., 1997b).
Finally, the conclusions are limited to couples who have recently ex-
perienced their transition to first-time parenthood as these constituted the
research population. The transition to parenthood generally involves in-
creases in marital distress and conflict, and the division of family work tends
to become more traditional (Belsky et al., 1986; Cowan et al., 1985; Grote
and Clark, 1998; Hackel and Ruble, 1992; Kluwer et al., 1998; Reichle and
Montada, 1994). Major life changes such as the transition to parenthood
often lead couples to reexamine their prior arrangements and reframe re-
lationship events so as to accentuate perceptions of injustice and imbalance
(Holmes and Levinger, 1994). The new division of labor generates consid-
erable discontent for wives because they feel that their husbands are not
living up to their expectancies (Hackel and Ruble, 1992). Negative emotions
related to feelings of injustice for which the spouse is blamed may have
serious negative consequences (Reichle, 1996). Conflict over the division
of labor is thus more salient and more likely to occur among couples who
just had their first child than among, for example, childless couples.
To conclude, this study provides both a structural and a behavioral
explanation for the persistence of gender inequality and gendered patterns
of role allocation. The effects of conflict structure and gender-linked be-
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haviors pertain to close relationships in general. More broadly, the status
quo effect pertains to any situation in which one conflict party (e.g., spouse,
employee, minority) desires a change in the current situation whereas the
other party (e.g., other spouse, employer, majority) wants to maintain the
status quo. A promising direction for future research is to examine the
mediating processes of the status quo effect and important moderator vari-
ables, both inside and outside the domain of close relationships.
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